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1 Introduction
Consider the classical problem of a Bertrand duopoly, i.e., two firms set prices to
compete for customers. A diﬃculty in modelling this situation is that when the firms
set the same price, customers are indiﬀerent with respect to where to buy, so that
it is unclear how to specify the firms’ profits (payoﬀs). Games with an endogenous
sharing rule, introduced by Simon and Zame (1990), avoid this diﬃculty by specifying
players’ payoﬀs by a correspondence rather than by a function, thus taking a broad
stand on how to specify players’ payoﬀs.
When analyzing a game with an endogenous sharing rule, one may be interested
in obtaining the existence of a strategy profile that is an equilibrium for each possible
sharing rule, henceforth, an invariant equilibrium. Indeed, whenever such invariant
equilibrium exists, the choice of the sharing rule becomes immaterial. Specifically, the
predictions provided by such invariant equilibrium are robust to the actual sharing
rule that happens to occur, e.g. the actual choice made by consumers regarding which
of the two duopolists to buy from.
An appealing scenario occurs when each strategy that is an equilibrium for some
sharing rule is an invariant equilibrium, henceforth, when the equilibrium set is invari-
ant. In this case, any equilibrium is robust to the actual sharing rule that happens to
occur and, based on this robustness notion, there is no need to select amongst the set
of equilibria. Furthermore, as pointed out by Lebrun (1996) and Jackson and Swinkels
(2005), the invariance of the equilibrium set is also important from a practical view-
point. Indeed, it allows us to analyze the equilibrium set of the game defined by a
sharing rule we may be interest in by analyzing the equilibrium set of the game defined
by any other (simpler, easier to analyze) sharing rule. In particular, in the presence
of incomplete information, it is often easier to establish the existence of equilibrium
for some type-independent sharing rule by first showing that some type-dependent
sharing rule has an equilibrium and then appeal to the invariance of the equilibrium
set.
In this paper, we establish results concerning the invariance of the equilibrium set
for general games with an endogenous sharing rule. Our first key condition, called
“virtual continuity,” roughly says that each player can, with a probability close to
one, avoid points at which the payoﬀ correspondence is multi-valued while virtually
2
achieving the same payoﬀ given the strategies of the other players, regardless of the
particular sharing rule which is in force.1 We show that, under this condition, the
equilibrium set coincides with the set of invariant equilibrium in the class of games
defined by eﬃcient sharing rules. More precisely, any strategy that is an equilibrium
of the game defined by some sharing rule is also an equilibrium in the game defined by
any eﬃcient sharing rule. This means that for equilibrium analysis of virtually contin-
uous games with an endogenous sharing rule, one may focus on eﬃcient sharing rules.
In this light, our result has the interesting interpretation that, in equilibrium, inde-
terminacies are resolved eﬃciently. Moreover, as we illustrate using simple Bertrand
examples, this result is also useful to compute the equilibrium set of games with an
endogenous sharing rule.
Our second key condition, called “strong indeterminacy,” roughly requires that in-
determinacies are not eliminated by focusing on eﬃcient sharing rules. More precisely,
if a player has, at some action profile, more than one possible payoﬀ, then there are
at least two eﬃcient payoﬀ profiles at that action profile giving diﬀerent payoﬀs to
that player. Our main result states that each game with an endogenous sharing rule
satisfying virtual continuity and strong indeterminacy has an invariant equilibrium
set.
The intuition for our results is as follows. First, virtual continuity implies that
each player’s value function (i.e. the function assigning to each strategy profile of the
other players the supremum of the payoﬀs he can achieve) is the same for all sharing
rules. Second, any equilibrium for some sharing rule remains an equilibrium for any
eﬃcient sharing rule. This is so because would some player’s payoﬀ decrease if the
former sharing rule is replaced by the latter, then, by eﬃciency, some other player’s
payoﬀ would increase. But this is impossible because, in equilibrium, the payoﬀ of any
player must be equal to the payoﬀ as determined by the value function at the strategy
profile of the other players, and, by the first point, the value function of any player
is the same for all sharing rules. From this we get the invariance of the equilibrium
set provided that the set of eﬃcient sharing rules gives the same indeterminacy set
for each player as the set of all sharing rules. But this is just the condition of strong
1Virtual continuity generalizes analogous conditions that appeared in Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986a, Theorem 5), Jackson and Swinkels (2005, Lemma 7) and Bagh (2010, Theorem 4.2).
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indeterminacy.
Jackson and Swinkels (2005) have established the invariance of the equilibrium
set for a specific setting of private-value auctions. Our contribution is to extend this
conclusion to a general framework. The generality of our approach allows us to ob-
tain new equilibrium invariance results for Bertrand competition with convex costs
(along the lines of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b) and Maskin (1986)), for electoral
competition (as in Duggan (2007)) and contests (as in Moldovanu and Sela (2001)).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider a simple motivating
example to illustrate our results. In Section 3 we present our main results. Section 4
contains applications of our results. In Section 5 we present extensions of our results,
in particular to Bayesian contexts. The proof of our results are in Section A.5 of the
Appendix.
2 A motivating example
Consider a standard Bertrand duopoly with zero costs and one commodity whose
demand is d(x) = 1   x where x is the lowest price in the market. Each of the two
firms sets a price in the unit interval to attract costumers. If prices are diﬀerent (i.e.
x1 6= x2), then the firm setting the lowest price, firm i say, receives a profit of (1 xi)xi
whereas the other firm receives a profit of zero. If x1 = x2, profits are indeterminate;
if  denotes the fraction of the demand allocated to firm 1, then (1   x1)x1 is the
profit of firm 1, and (1  )(1  x1)x1 is that of firm 2;  is allowed to take any value
in [0; 1]. The situation can thus be described by an endogenous sharing rule with two
players (the two firms), each having as its action set the interval [0; 1], and with a
payoﬀ correspondence Q : [0; 1]2 ! R2 defined by setting, for each x 2 [0; 1]2,
Q(x) =
8>><>>:
(x1(1  x1); 0) if x1 < x2;
(0; x2(1  x2)) if x1 > x2;
f(x1(1  x1); x1(1  )(1  x1)) :  2 [0; 1]g if x1 = x2:
It turns out that the discussion of how to specify payoﬀ in this Bertrand duopoly
problem is immaterial for equilibrium analysis. Indeed, a particular way of specifying
payoﬀs amounts to choosing a (measurable) selection of the payoﬀ correspondence
and, for any such choice, the resulting normal-form game has a unique equilibrium
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(both in pure and mixed strategies) where both firms set a price of zero. This is well-
known for the case of the equal-sharing rule defined by setting  = 1=2 independently
of the price vector x (see, e.g. Kaplan and Wettstein (2000)) and it will follow from
our invariance result in the general case.
3 Invariance of the equilibrium set
3.1 Preliminaries
A game   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) with an endogenous sharing rule is defined by a finite
set N of players, a compact metric space Xi of actions for each i 2 N , and an upper
hemicontinuous (uhc in the sequel) payoﬀ correspondence Q : X ! RN with non-
empty compact values, writing X =
Q
i2N Xi. The interpretation is that Q(x) is the
set of possible payoﬀ vectors for the players when action profile x is played.
We consider mixed strategies. For each player i, we write Mi for the set of mixed
strategies available for him. The set Mi is just the set of Borel probability measures
on Xi. We write M =
Q
i2N Mi for the set of all mixed strategy profiles. Given
 = (1; : : : ; n) 2 M , we write  for the corresponding product measure on X.
For each i 2 N and xi 2 Xi, xi denotes the Dirac measure at xi, i.e. the measure
assigning probability 1 to the singleton fxig.
Let   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) be an endogenous sharing rule game. A measurable selec-
tion of Q is a measurable function q : X ! RN such that q(x) 2 Q(x) for all x 2 X.
Any such q corresponds to a particular sharing rule of players’ payoﬀs. We write
SQ for the set of all measurable selections of Q. For each q 2 SQ, Gq = (Xi; qi)i2N
is a normal-form game. For each i 2 N and  2 M , let qi : M ! R be defined
by setting qi() =
R
X
qid. The mixed extension of Gq is the normal-form game
Gq = (Mi; qi)i2N . A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of Gq = (Xi; qi)i2N is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of Gq. Let E(Gq) denote the set of mixed strategy Nash
equilibria of Gq. From now on, we abuse notation and write qi() instead of qi() for
each i 2 N and  2M .
We say that  2 M is an equilibrium of the game   with an endogenous sharing
rule if  is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for some q 2 SQ, i.e.  2
S
q2SQ E(Gq).
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We write E( ) for the set of all equilibria of  .2 For  2 E( ), we say that  is an
invariant equilibrium of   if  is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for each q 2 SQ
i.e.  2 Tq2SQ E(Gq). We write I( ) for the set of invariant equilibria of  .
Given x 2 X, we say that a payoﬀ vector r 2 Q(x) is eﬃcient if it is not dominated
by any other payoﬀ vector r0 2 Q(x); formally, r 2 Q(x) is eﬃcient if r0 2 Q(x) and
r0  r implies r0 = r. We write Qe for the correspondence which assigns to each
action profile x 2 X the set of eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors. Thus, Qe : X ! RN is given
by setting
Qe(x) = fr 2 Q(x) : r is eﬃcientg
for each x 2 X. We write SQe for the set of all measurable selections of Qe . Taking
q 2 SQ such such that, for each x 2 X, q(x) solves maxr2Q(x)
P
i2N ri shows that
SQe 6= ;; see Lemma 5 in Appendix A.1. For  2 E( ), we say that  is a Qe-
invariant equilibrium of   if  2 Tq2SQe E(Gq). Let Ie( ) be the set of Qe-invariant
equilibria.
For each i 2 N , write i for the projection of Rn onto the i-th copy of R. Let
Qi = i  Q and note that Qi is uhc with nonempty and compact values. Let Di be
the set of action profiles at which Qi is multi-valued, i.e.,
Di = fx 2 X : #(Qi(x)) > 1g:
We say that   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) is strongly indeterminate if #(i  Qe(x)) > 1 for
each i 2 N and x 2 Di. In words,   is strongly indeterminate if whenever a player
has, at some action profile, more than one possible payoﬀ, then there are at least two
eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors at that action profile giving diﬀerent payoﬀs to that player.
Equivalently,   is strongly indeterminate if Di = Dei for each i 2 N , where
Dei = fx 2 X : #(i Qe(x)) > 1g:
For each q 2 SQ and i 2 N , player i’s value function is the function vqi : M ! R
defined by setting vqi() = sup0i2Mi qi(
0
i;  i) for each  2M .
2The set f(q; ) 2 SQM :  2 E(Gq)g is the set of solutions of   (see Simon and Zame (1990));
the projection of this set in M equals E( ).
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3.2 Virtual continuity
Our definition of virtual continuity is as follows. We say that an endogenous sharing
rule game   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) is virtually continuous if for each q 2 SQ, i 2 N , " > 0
and  2M there is a i 2Mi such that
(i; i)(Di) < " and qi(i;  i) > qi()  ":
Note that, by Lemma 4 in Appendix A.1, Di is measurable for each i 2 N , so
(i; i)(Di) is defined; recall from Section 3.1 that (i; i) denotes the joint prob-
ability measure when player i plays according to i and the other players together
play according to  i. In words,   is virtually continuous if each player can, with
a probability close to one, avoid points at which his own payoﬀ correspondence is
multi-valued while virtually achieving the same payoﬀ given the strategies of the
other players, regardless of the particular sharing rule which is in force.
The Bertrand example in Section 2 is easily seen to be virtually continuous as
follows. First, for each i = 1; 2, player i’s payoﬀ correspondence is multi-valued only
on a subset of the diagonal  = f(t; t) : t 2 [0; 1]g, i.e. Di  . Second, for each
i = 1; 2, " > 0 and x 2 Di, player i can obtain a payoﬀ higher than maxQi(x)   "
by deviating to any xi < xi suﬃciently closed to xi (note that Q(0; 0) = f(0; 0)g and,
hence, (0; 0) 62 Di; thus player i can lower its price at any x 2 Di). Example 1 below
shows that these two properties are indeed suﬃcient for virtual continuity.
Example 1. Consider an endogenous sharing rule game   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) where
N = f1; 2g, X1 = X2 = [0; 1], and D1, D2  , writing  = f(t; t) : t 2 [0; 1]g.
Consider the following hypothesis. For each i = 1; 2, each " > 0, and each x 2 Di,
there is a set Ci(x)  [0; 1] such that (i) xi is a condensation point of Ci(x) (i.e.
any neighborhood of xi contains uncountably many points of Ci(x)), (ii) Qi(x) >
maxQi(x)  " for each x 2 (Ci(x) fxjg)nfxg, where j 6= i (writing (x2; x1) instead
of (x1; x2) if i = 2; note also that #(Qi(x)) = 1 for x 2 X nDi, so the inequality in
(ii) is defined). Then virtual continuity holds (see Section A.5.1 for a proof).
Verifying virtual continuity in a particular game with an endogenous sharing rule
is potentially daunting as one needs to consider all possible selections of the payoﬀ
correspondence. The next result may be helpful in this regard. Define mi : X ! R,
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i 2 N , by setting mi(x) = maxq2Q(x) qi for each x 2 X, which is possible because Q
takes non-empty compact values, and note that because Q is also uhc, mi is upper
semicontinuous, therefore measurable. Lemma 1 states that, to show that   is virtually
continuous, it is suﬃcient and necessary to verify the conditions in the definition of
virtually continuity for mi, i 2 N .
Lemma 1. Let   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) be a game with an endogenous sharing rule. Then
  is virtually continuous if and only if, for each i 2 N , " > 0 and  2 M there is a
i 2Mi such that
(i; i)(Di) < " and mi(i;  i) > mi()  ":
See Section A.5.2 for a proof of this lemma.
An important implication of virtual continuity is that, in any endogenous sharing
rule game   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) satisfying it and for every player, the value functions
defined from the elements of SQ all agree.
Lemma 2. If   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) is virtually continuous, then vqi = vq0i for each
q, q0 2 SQ and i 2 N ; in particular, if  2 E(Gq), then  2 E(Gq0) if and only if
qi() = q
0
i() for each i 2 N .
This lemma holds because given some strategy profile  yielding a payoﬀ close to
the supremum of what a player i can obtain under a payoﬀ function q 2 SQ given
 i, there is strategy i for player i with the following properties: First, (i;  i) also
gives a payoﬀ close to the supremum of what a player i can obtain under a payoﬀ
function q and, second, the payoﬀ of (i;  i) under q is roughly the same as under
any other payoﬀ function q0 2 SQ because, with a probability close to one, (i;  i)
avoids points at which his own payoﬀ correspondence is multi-valued (see Section
A.5.3 for a more detailed proof).
Section A.2 contains additional discussion on virtual continuity.
3.3 Structure of the equilibrium set
The importance of virtual continuity for the invariance of the equilibrium set of a
game with an endogenous sharing rule started to appear in the Lemma 2 above as it
establishes the invariance of the value functions of each player. While this property is
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not enough for the invariance of the equilibrium set, it already implies that all eﬃcient
selections have the same equilibrium set. Moreover, as this common equilibrium set
turns out to be the entire equilibrium set, our first result in this section provides a
characterization of equilibria in virtually continuous games.
Theorem 1. If   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) is virtually continuous, then E( ) = Ie( ).
As the proof of this theorem is short and illustrative for our condition of virtual
continuity, it is presented here.
Proof of Theorem 1. Clearly Ie( )  E( ). For the reverse inclusion, let q 2 SQ,
 2 E(Gq) and q^ 2 SQe . Then (fx 2 X : q^i(x) > qi(x)g) = 0 for all i 2 N . Indeed,
pick any i 2 N and write F = fx 2 X : q^i(x) > qi(x)g. Suppose that (F ) > 0. Set
~q = q^1F + q1XnF . Then ~q 2 SQ and ~qi() > qi(). Hence, by Lemma 2,
vqi( i) = v~qi( i)  ~qi() > qi();
contradicting the assumption that  is an equilibrium for q. Thus (F ) = 0.
Suppose now that there is an i 2 N such that (fx 2 X : q^i(x) < qi(x)g) > 0. As
q^ 2 SQe , there must then be a j 2 N such that (fx 2 X : q^j(x) > qj(x)g) > 0. But
this is impossible by what has been shown in the previous paragraph.
It follows that for all i 2 N , (fx 2 X : q^i(x) 6= qi(x)g) = 0. By Lemma 2, we
conclude that  is an equilibrium for q^.
A simple application of Theorem 1 can be made in the context of the equilibrium
existence result for endogenous sharing rule games established by Simon and Zame
(1990). Recall that in this latter result, the payoﬀ correspondence is required to take
convex values, and that an equilibrium needs to exist just for some selection which
cannot be specified. In both of these aspects, Theorem 1 can be used to get an
improvement if virtual continuity holds.
Theorem 2. If   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) is virtually continuous, then E( ) 6= ;; in fact,
E(Gq) 6= ; for every q 2 SQe .
The point of Theorem 2 is that virtually continuity dispenses the need for the
payoﬀ correspondence to have convex values, as detailed in the following remark (see
Section A.5.4 for a proof of Theorem 2).
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Remark 1. None of our results requires the payoﬀ correspondence to take convex
values. Actually, under our condition of virtual continuity, convexifying payoﬀs does
not alter the equilibrium set, and also not the invariant equilibrium set. Indeed, let
  = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) be a virtually continuous game and define  0 = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q0)
by letting Q0(x) be the convex hull of Q(x) for each x 2 X. As shown in the proof
of Theorem 2,  0 is virtually continuous and SQe \ SQ0e 6= ;; this, together with
Theorem 1, implies that E( ) = E( 0). Since SQ  SQ0 , it follows that I( 0)  I( ).
For the converse, let  2 I( ). Let q 2 SQ0 and i 2 N . Let q 2 SQ \ SQ0 be such
that q
i
(x) = minr2Q(x) ri = minr2Q0(x) ri for each x 2 X. Then qi()  qi(). By
Lemma 2, applied in  0, vq
i
() = vqi(). As  2 I( ), vqi() = qi(). It follows that
qi() = vqi(). As i 2 N is arbitrary,  2 E(Gq). As q 2 SQ0 is arbitrary,  2 I( 0).
Remark 2. Instead of appealing to Simon and Zame (1990) and our invariance result
Theorem 1, Theorem 2 can also be proved by using Reny (1999, Corollary 5.2). Indeed,
give M the narrow topology. Then virtual continuity implies that, for every q 2 SQ,
the mixed extension of Gq is payoﬀ secure; see Lemma 9 in the Appendix. Moreover,
if q 2 SQ is such that q(x) solves maxr2Q(x)
P
i2N ri for each x 2 X (see Lemma 5),
then the mixed extension of Gq is reciprocal upper semicontinuous; see Reny (1999,
Proposition 5.1). Thus, by Reny (1999, Corollary 5.2), the mixed extension of Gq
is better-reply secure and has an equilibrium (see Reny (1999) for the definitions of
better-reply security and reciprocal upper semicontinuity).
Heading towards invariance of the equilibrium set, we next provide a characteriza-
tion of invariant equilibria which we will use in our main result. This characterization
has interest in its own right as it shows which equilibria are invariant and which ones
are not.
Theorem 3. If   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) is virtually continuous, then
I( ) = f 2 E( ) : (Di) = 0 for all i 2 Ng :
Theorem 3 shows that invariant equilibria are precisely those equilibria that assign
zero probability to the indeterminacy set of each player (see Section A.5.5 for its
proof). Indeed, any such equilibrium  yields the same payoﬀ for all q 2 SQ and, thus,
it is an invariant equilibrium by Lemma 2. Conversely, any invariant equilibrium 
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yields the same payoﬀ for any player and any q 2 SQ (equal to the player’s value of
the common value function at ) and this is possible only if  assigns zero probability
to the indeterminacy set of each player.
We now address the question of when E( ) = I( ). Having this equality is of
interest because it implies that any selection of the payoﬀ correspondence can be used
to find an equilibrium for any other selection. A suﬃcient condition for having E( ) =
I( ) is that   be strongly indeterminate in addition to being virtual continuous.
Theorem 4. Let   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) be virtually continuous. Then the following
holds:
1. If  2 E( ) then (Dei ) = 0 for all i 2 N .
2. If   is strongly indeterminate, then I( ) = E( ).
The first part of Theorem 4 is analogous to Theorem 3: Any equilibrium is, by
Theorem 1, a Qe-invariant equilibrium, and any Qe-invariant equilibrium  yields
the same payoﬀ for any player and any q 2 SQe (equal to the player’s value of the
common value function at ); this is possible only if  assigns zero probability to the
indeterminacy set of each player. (The proof of this latter fact is more involved here
because, unlike Q, Qe need not be uhc with compact values; see Section A.5.6 for a
proof of Theorem 4.) It is then clear that I( ) = E( ) holds whenever Di = Dei for
each player i — but this is precisely the requirement of strong indeterminacy.
A simple class of games with an endogenous sharing rule that satisfy strong inde-
terminacy is provided in the following example.
Example 2. If   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) is a constant-sum endogenous sharing rule game
(i.e., for some c 2 R, Pi2N ri = c for all r 2 Q(x) and all x 2 X) then Q = Qe and
thus   is strongly indeterminate. Consequently, if such a   is virtually continuous,
then I( ) = E( ). Thus, in particular, if   is a two-person, constant-sum endogenous
sharing rule game which satisfies the hypothesis in Example 1, then I( ) = E( ).
Remark 3. In this remark we take a brief look at quasi-concave games. Recall that a
game   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) is quasi-concave if, for each i 2 N , Xi is a convex subset of
an Euclidean space (or, more generally, of a locally convex topological vector space)
and there is a q 2 SQ such that, for each i 2 N and x i 2 X i, the function xi 7!
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qi(xi; x i) is quasi-concave. Identify, for each i 2 N , Xi with the set of Dirac measures
at the points of this space. Using Bich and Laraki (2017, Theorem 3.4) it follows that
if   is quasi-concave, then X \ E( ) 6= ;. Moreover, if   is virtually continuous
and strongly indeterminate, then E( ) = I( ) by Theorem 4 and, therefore, X \
E( ) = X \ I( ). In words, invariance in mixed strategies implies invariance in
pure strategies. However, as it can be easily shown, the latter holds when virtually
continuity is required to hold only for pure strategies, in the following sense: For each
q 2 SQ, i 2 N , " > 0 and x 2 X, there is an xi 2 Xi such that (xi; x i) 62 Di and
qi(xi; x i) > qi(x)  ":
The following two examples illustrate the scope of Theorem 4. To obtain an in-
variant equilibrium set, strong indeterminacy cannot be dispensed with (Example 3)
and it is not enough to assume that the requirements of virtual continuity hold for
only one measurable selection of the payoﬀ correspondence (Example 4).
Example 3. Modify the example in Section 2 by taking X2 = [c; 1] with 0 < c < 1=2
(i.e., firm 2 has constant marginal cost c with 0 < c < 1=2), so that for each x 2 X,
Q(x) =
8>><>>:
(x1(1  x1); 0) if x1 < x2;
(0; (x2   c)(1  x2)) if x1 > x2;
f(x1(1  x1); (x1   c)(1  )(1  x1)) :  2 [0; 1]g if x1 = x2:
Note that D1 = fx 2 X : x1 = x2g.
It follows by Example 1 that   is virtually continuous. However, E( ) 6= I( ).
Indeed, if q 2 SQ is such that (c; c) = 1, then (c; c) 2 E(Gq)  E( ). But
(c; c) =2 E(Gq) if q 2 SQ is such that (c; c) < 1. Thus (c; c) =2 I( ).
This shows that virtual continuity is not enough to ensure E( ) = I( ), and thus
highlights the role of strong indeterminacy as a condition in Theorem 4. Indeed this
latter condition fails at (c; c), because (c; c) 2 D1 but #(1 Qe(x)) = 1.
Example 4. The following example (whose setup is as in Simon and Zame (1990))
illustrates why our notion of virtual continuity is required to hold for all selections
of the payoﬀ correspondence, rather than just for one. Let N = f1; 2g, X1 = [0; 3],
X2 = [3; 4], and for each x 2 X,
Q(x) =
8<:
 
x1+x2
2
; 4  x1+x2
2
	
if x 6= (3; 3);
f(; 4  ) :  2 [0; 4]g if x = (3; 3)
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Note that if q 2 SQ is such that q(3; 3) = (3; 1), then E(Gq) = f(3; 3)g.
The function q just specified is continuous, so the requirements of virtual conti-
nuity hold for q. Also, strong indeterminacy holds; in fact Q = Qe . But I( ) = ;.
Indeed, suppose (1; 2) 2 I( ). Then, in particular, (1; 2) 2 E( q), which implies
that (1; 2) = (3; 3). But (3; 3) =2 E(Gq^) if q^ 2 SQ is such that q^(3; 3) = (4; 0).
This contradiction shows that I( ) = ;. Finally, note that q^1(x1; 3) < 3 whenever
x1 < 3, i.e., whenever (x1; 3) 2 X1nD1. Thus the requirements of virtual continuity
are not satisfied for q^.
4 Applications
4.1 Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with convex costs
In this section we consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with convex costs. The
standard formalization of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, according to which the
firm posting the lowest price serves the entire demand, leads to diﬃculties in this
setting. This is so because firms may prefer to tie to reduce the quantity produced.
But this desire of a firm to tie is rather artificial and a consequence of the assumption
that the firm posting the lowest price must serve the entire demand. In other words,
the standard formalization is not appropriate for the case of convex costs; rather, it
is more appropriate to allow firms to choose the quantity they want to supply. We
allow for this by allowing each firm to choose a price and the maximum production
level it is willing to produce. Our formalization is analogous to that of Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986b, Section 2.2) where each firm has an exogenously given capacity; here,
in contrast, we assume that the capacity of each firm is endogenous, i.e. it is chosen
by the firm. Our formalization is also analogous to that of Maskin (1986) where firms
choose both prices and quantities, and firms produce to order, i.e., produce only after
the entire price profile has been observed.
As in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b), there is a market for a single commodity
with a continuum of consumers represented by the unit interval [0; 1]. Consumers are
identical, and the representative consumer’s demand for the commodity is a contin-
uous and decreasing function d : R+ ! R+ such that there exists p > 0 satisfying
d(p) > 0 for all p < p and d(p) = 0 for all p  p. There is a continuous, increasing
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and strictly convex cost function c : R+ ! R+ with c(0) = 0.
There are n 2 N firms. Each firm i 2 N = f1; : : : ; ng chooses a price pi and a
capacity si, the latter being the maximum amount the firm is willing to produce. Let
P = [0; p] and S = [0; d(0)].
To specify how the demand is allocated to firms, it is convenient to consider first
the case of two firms. In this case, if one firm oﬀers a price p lower than the price p0
oﬀered by the other firm, it serves the entire market up to its capacity s. A fraction
(d(p) s)+
d(p)
= maxfd(p) s;0g
d(p)
of consumers is not served and each of these consumers de-
mands d(p0) from the firm oﬀering the highest price. When both firms set the same
price, then the demand at the common price is split by each firm up to its capacity.
Formally, the quantities produced by firms are described by the correspondence
 : (P  S)2 ! R2+ defined by setting, for each (p; s) 2 (P  S)2,
(p; s) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(minfd(p1); s1g;minf (d(p1) s1)+d(p1) d(p2); s2g) if p1 < p2;
 2 R2+ : 1 + 2  d(p1); i  si and
[d(p1)  1   2][si   i] = 0 for each i = 1; 2g if p1 = p2;
(minf (d(p2) s2)+
d(p2)
d(p1); s1g;minfd(p2); s2g) if p1 > p2:
When prices are diﬀerent, these quantities are the same as in both Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986b) and Maskin (1986) (with the proportional rationing rule in the latter).
There are, however, diﬀerences between our formalization and theirs when prices are
equal. First, we allow for indeterminacy, whereas they do not. Second, we rule out
the possibility that a firm produces less than its capacity when there is unfulfilled
demand (i.e. i < si and 1 + 2 < d(p1) for some i is not possible); in contrast this
is allowed in both Dasgupta and Maskin (1986b) and Maskin (1986).
We now return to the general case of n firms. We start by defining the following
correspondence : (P  S)n ! Rn+. Fix any (p; s) 2 (P  S)n. Order the elements of
the set fp1; : : : ; png so that p(1) <    < p(L(p)). Set N (l) = fi 2 N : pi = p(l)g for each
l = 1; : : : ; L(p). Define numbers D(l)(p; s), l = 1; : : : ; L(p), recursively in the following
way. Set D(1)(p; s) = d(p(1)); given that D(l0)(p; s) has been specified for all l0 with
1  l0  l   1 < L(p), set
D(l)(p; s) =
D(l 1)(p; s) minfD(l 1)(p; s);Pj2N(l 1) sjg
d(p(l 1))
d(p(l)):
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Now set
(p; s) =
(
 2 Rn+ : i  si; i = 1; : : : ; n;
X
j2N(l)
j = min
n
D(l)(p; s);
X
j2N(l)
sj
o
; l = 1; : : : ; L(p)
)
:
The correspondence  is closed. To see this, let (pk; sk) be a sequence in (P S)n
with (pk; sk) ! (p; s) 2 (P  S)n, and (k) a sequence in Rn with k 2 (pk; sk)
for each k and k ! . We may assume that L(pk) is constant along the sequence
(pk), say L(pk) = K for all k. Then for each k, we have L(p)  L(pk) = K, and we
can group the elements of f1; : : : ; Kg into non-empty disjoint sets A(1); : : : ; A(L(p)) so
that for each 1  l  L(p) and any choice of pk;i with pk;i = p(h)k for some h 2 A(l),
k 2 N, we have pk;i ! p(l). It is straightforward to check, using induction, together
with continuity of d and continuity of taking minima, that for each l = 1; : : : ; L(p),P
h2A(l)
P
i2N(h) k;i ! min

D(l)(p; s);
P
j2N(l) sj
	
(just recalculate the limits of the
sums
P
h2A(l)
P
i2N(h) k;i). Consequently  2 (p; s).
Since the values taken by  are included in a common compact set, the fact that 
is closed implies that  is uhc and takes compact values. Clearly  takes non-empty
values.
The above specification of  allows firms to choose any capacity. However some
choices are easily seen to be redundant. In fact, for each i 2 N , it suﬃces to consider
capacity choices that are solutions of the problem
max
0sd(pi)
pis  c(s):
Note that because c is strictly convex, a solution of this problem is unique. Let
s : P ! R describe this solution as a function on P . Note that s is continuous, with
s(0) = s(p) = 0, and that, given pi 2 P , if z  0 is a number with z  s(pi), then
z0 = z is the profit maximizing quantity choice of i subject to z0 2 [0; z].
This discussion leads to consider the following game   with an endogenous sharing
rule. For each i 2 N let the action set be P and define the payoﬀ correspondence
Q : P n ! Rn by setting, for each p 2 P n,
Q(p) = f(p11   c(1); : : : ; pnn   c(n)) :  2 (p; ~s(p))g;
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writing ~s(p) = (s(p1); : : : ; s(pn)). Then Q takes non-empty values. By the facts that
the map c is continuous and the correspondence  takes compact values, we see that
Q takes compact values, and in addition, using the facts that  is uhc, the maps d
and s are continuous, and that s(p) = 0, we can see that Q is uhc.
To check strong indeterminacy, fix p 2 P n and consider any i 2 N . Let p(l) be
the element of the order p(1) <    < p(L(p)) such that pi = p(l). Suppose p 2 Di.
Then pi > 0, s(pi) > 0, #(N (l)) > 1, and
P
j2N(l) s
(pj) > D(l)(p; ~s(p)) > 0. These
facts together imply strong indeterminacy, because (see above) payoﬀs are strictly
increasing on [0; s(pj)].
As for virtual continuity, fix i 2 N , pi 2 P with pi > 0, and " > 0. Note that
given any 0  p0i < pi and p i 2 P n i, and given any q 2 SQ, for some numbers
0      1 we have qi(pi; p i) = piminfd(pi); s(pi)g   c(minfd(pi); s(pi)g)
and qi(p0i; p i) = p0iminfd(p0i); s(p0i)g   c(minfd(p0i); s(p0i)g). Continuity of s, c,
and d, together with compactness of [0; 1], imply that there is a  > 0 such that
whenever pi    < p0i < pi and  2 [0; 1], then
p0iminfd(p0i); s(p0i)g   c(minfd(p0i); s(p0i)g)
> piminfd(pi); s(pi)g   c(minfd(pi); s(pi)g)  ":
As payoﬀs are non-decreasing on [0; s(pi)], it follows that qi(p0i; p i) > qi(pi; p i)  "
for all p i 2 P n i whenever pi   < p0i < pi. Consequently the hypotheses of Lemma 8
are satisfied. Thus virtual continuity holds.
By Theorems 2 and 4, we conclude that I( ) = E( ) 6= ;.
4.2 Electoral competition
We consider a location/voting model as in Duggan (2007, Section 6). The setting is
as follows. There are 2 players i = 1; 2 (e.g. political candidates), choosing locations
x1, x2, respectively, in a compact and convex subset A of Rm, m > 0, with nonempty
interior. When these location diﬀer, then, for each i = 1; 2, the payoﬀ is given by
ui(x1; x2) = (f 2 A : jj  xijj < jj  xjjj; j 6= ig);
where jj  jj denotes the Euclidean norm and  is a measure on A which is absolutely
continuous with respect to (m-dimensional) Lebesgue measure. The interpretation is
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that there is a set of individuals whose location in A is distributed according to  and
that each individual is attracted to the player located closest to him. (Note that as
long as x1 6= x2, absolute continuity of  with respect to Lebesgue measure implies
that points a 2 A with ka   x1k = ka   x2k don’t matter for the payoﬀs of the
two players.) Now if x1 = x2, there is no canonical way to determine payoﬀs; in fact,
perturbing such a situation can lead to diﬀerent payoﬀ sharings in the limit when the
perturbations vanish; see the example given in Section 2. It is therefore natural to
analyze this situation using a game with an endogenous sharing rule, rather than to
make an ad hoc specification of payoﬀs as in Duggan (2007), where it is assumed that
whenever players choose the same locations, payoﬀs are distributed in equal shares.
Without loss of generality, we assume that (A) = 1. Let S = fp 2 Rm : kpk = 1g.
For each p 2 S and each z 2 A, let (p; z) = (fa 2 A : pa < pzg). Note that for
x1, x2 2 A with x1 6= x2, we can write u1(x1; x2) = 
 
x2 x1
kx2 x1k ;
1
2
(x1 + x2)

and
u2(x1; x2) = 
 
x1 x2
kx1 x2k ;
1
2
(x1 + x2)

. If x1, x2 2 A with x1 = x2 = z, let
Q(x1; x2) = f(r1; r2) : r2 = 1  r1; r1 = (p; z) for some p 2 Sg:
If x1, x2 2 A with x1 6= x2, let Q(x1; x2) = fu1(x1; x2); u2(x1; x2)g.
Lemma 3. (a) The correspondence Q is closed. (b) Virtual continuity is satisfied.
For a rough intuition for why virtual continuity holds, consider x 2 D1 with
x1 2 int(A). Indeterminacies only arise when candidates choose the same policy, we
have x1 = x2. Letting p 2 S be such that (p; x1) = maxQ1(x), player 1 satisfies the
requirements of virtual continuity provided in Example 1 by deviating to x1   p for
all suﬃciently small  > 0. Indeed, u1(x1   p; x2) = (p; x1 + 12p) ! (p; x1) as
! 0. (See Section A.5.7 for a proof of Lemma 3).
Obviously, the game   we have discussed is a constant-sum game and thus satisfies
strong indeterminacy. It therefore follows from Lemma 3 and Theorems 2 and 4 that
I( ) = E( ) 6= ;,
Remark 4. (a) Contrary to the case m = 1, if m > 1 then (because S is connected
if m > 1) continuity of  implies that the correspondence Q takes convex values.
In particular, because maxp2S (p; z)  1=2  minp2S (p; z) for each z 2 A, equal
sharing is allowed when payoﬀs are indeterminate and m > 1. Equal sharing is also
allowed when m = 1 by convexifying payoﬀs as in Remark 1.
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(b) The correspondence Q is the smallest closed correspondence which includes
the map (u1; u2) (in the sense of set inclusion of the graphs). (See Section A.5.8 for a
proof).
Remark 5. The analysis of this section does not extend to the case of three or more
players. Indeed, suppose N = f1; 2; 3g, let Xi = [ 1; 1] for each i 2 N , write  for
Lebesgue measure, and let Q : X ! R3 be the smallest closed correspondence which
includes the map u : X 0 ! R3, where X 0 = fx 2 X : xi 6= xj for each i 6= jg and
ui(x) = (fa 2 [ 1; 1] : ja  xij < ja  xjj for all j 6= ig):
Consider i = 1. There is a q 2 SQ such that q1(0; 0; 1) = q1(0; 0; 1) = 1. Let
 = (0; 0;
1+ 1
2
). Then q1() = 1, and a simple calculation shows that for each
x1 62 f 1; 0; 1g, q1(x1 ;  1)  3=4. In light of Lemma 7 in Appendix A.2, it follows
that   is not virtually continuous.
5 Extension: Incomplete Information
In this section we extend our results to the case of incomplete information. Specif-
ically, we consider incomplete information games with indeterminate outcomes, as
introduced by Jackson, Simon, Swinkels, and Zame (2002), i.e., games where the as-
signment of payoﬀs to type/action profiles factors through a correspondence to some
space of possible outcomes. We will present two results. The first one can be in-
terpreted as assuming that the auctioneer knows the realizations of players’ types
and can use this information when implementing tie breaking rules. In Jackson and
Swinkels (2005), this case is called that of an “omniscient auctioneer.” In the second
one, which is a corollary of the first, we turn to the more realistic case where the
auctioneer does not have any information about players’ types.
A game with indeterminate outcomes is described as follows. There is a finite set
N = f1; : : : ; ng of players. For each i 2 N , there is a compact metric action space
Ai and a compact metric type space Ti. Write A =
Q
i2N Ai and T =
Q
i2N Ti. Type
profiles, i.e., elements of T , are chosen according to a (Borel) probability measure 
on T ;3 write i for the marginal measure on Ti, i 2 N . As usual in the context of
3We use B(T ) and B(A) to denote the Borel -algebra of T and A, respectively.
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Bayesian games, it is assumed that  is absolutely continuous with respect to the
product 1  n. There is an outcome space 
, assumed to be a compact metric
space. Players’ actions determine a set of possible outcomes via an uhc correspondence
 : A ! 
 with nonempty and compact values. The payoﬀs (or utilities) of players
are determined by a continuous function u : T  graph()! RN .
The payoﬀ correspondence Q : T  A! RN is now defined by setting
Q(t; a) = fu(t; a; !) : ! 2 (a)g
for each (t; a) 2 T  A. Note that Q is uhc and has nonempty and compact values.
Additional notation is as before: given i 2 N , i denotes the projection of RN on
the ith coordinate, and we write Qi = i  Q, qi = i  q for q 2 SQ, and Di =
f(t; a) 2 T  A : #(Qi(t; a)) > 1g.
Following Balder (1988), we describe a mixed strategy i of player i by a Young
measure from Ti to Ai, i.e., a map from Ti to the spaceM(Ai) of probability measures
on Ai such that the map ti 7! i(ti)(B) is Borel-measurable for each Borel set B in
Ai.4 As in Section 3, Mi is the set of mixed strategies available for player i, now with
the interpretation as a space of Young measures. Again, we write M =
Q
i2N Mi for
the set of all profiles of mixed strategies.
As for payoﬀs, consider any  = (1; : : : ; n) 2 M . For every t = (t1; : : : ; tn) 2 T
write (t) for the Borel measure on A defined by setting (t) = 1(t1)     n(tn).
Then the map t 7! (t) is a Young measure from T to M(A).5 By Neveu (1965,
Proposition III.2.1) it follows that there is a uniquely determined probability measure
 on TA such that (EB) =
R
E
(t)(B) d(t) for each E 2 B(T ) and B 2 B(A).
Now, for any q 2 SQ and i 2 N , the integral
R
TA qi(t; a) d(t; a) is defined, because
qi is bounded and measurable, and by the generalized version of Fubini’s theorem (see
again Neveu (1965, Proposition III.2.1)) we haveZ
TA
qi(t; a) d(t; a) =
Z
T
Z
A
qi(t; a) d(t)(a) d(t) :
Because, given any realization t 2 T of possible type profiles, the payoﬀ of player i isR
A
qi(t; a) d(t)(a) (exactly as in the deterministic framework of the previous sections),
4In Milgrom and Weber (1985) such notion of a mixed strategy is called a behavioral strategy
and, as they note, is equivalent to the notion of a distributional strategy that they consider.
5To see that t 7! (t)(B) is measurable for each B 2 B(A), observe that this is true if B is a
product of Borel subsets Bi of Ti, i = 1; : : : ; n, and use the monotone class theorem.
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we see that in the Bayesian framework considered now, the payoﬀ of this player can be
written as
R
TA qi(t; a) d(t; a). Again, we use the expression qi() as abbreviation.
As in Section 4.1 on Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, one may restrict players’
choices of strategies so as that these have certain dominance properties; see also
Example 6 below on Bertrand competition where each firm is restricted to set prices
above its marginal cost. This can be done by specifying, for each i 2 N , an uhc
correspondence i : Ti ! Ai, with non-empty closed values, and considering only
strategy profiles  such that for each i 2 N , i(ti)(i(ti)) = 1 for i-a.e. ti 2 Ti.
Write Wi for the set of all i 2Mi satisfying this restriction, and let W =
Q
i2N Wi.
Given such correspondences i, it might be of interest to get an invariance result in
W . For this the following notion of virtual continuity is appropriate (see Example 6).
Writing  for the list (1; : : : ;n), we say that a game is -virtually continuous if
for any q 2 SQ, i 2 N ,  2 Mi  W i, and " > 0, there is a i 2 Wi such that
(i; i)(Di) < " and qi(i;  i) > qi()  ". Note that when i  Ai for each i 2 N ,
the requirements of -virtual continuity are the same as those in Section 3; in general,
the diﬀerence is that now i is required to be in Wi and that (i; i)(Di) < " and
qi(i;  i) > qi()  " need to hold only when  i 2 W i.
Finally, given , some generality can be gained by relaxing strong indeterminacy
into the requirement that there be a Borel set K  T A such that both (K) = 0
for each  2 W and #(i  Qe(t; a)) > 1 for each i 2 N and each (t; a) 2 Di n K
(see Example 6). We will call this notion -strong indeterminacy. If T is absent (i.e.
if T is a singleton), then this notion is the same as in Section 3 but here we may have
#(i Qe(t; a)) = 1 for some i 2 N and some (t; a) 2 Di, for instance, in a null set
of types.
Theorem 5. Let   = (N; (Ti; Ai;i; ui)i2N ; ;) be a game with indeterminate out-
comes. Suppose that   is -virtually continuous and -strongly indeterminate. Then
E( ) \W = I( ) \W 6= ;.
The proof of Theorem 5 (in Section A.5.9) is analogous to that of Theorems 1–4,
the existence part being now more involved. In particular, the requirement in the
definition of -virtual continuity that i belongs to Wi plays a role in guaranteeing
that there is an equilibrium in W .
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Theorem 5 implies an invariance and existence result for selections of the payoﬀ
correspondence which are determined by selections of the outcome correspondence,
i.e., for elements q of SQ which can be written in the form q(t; a) = u(t; a; (a)) for
some measurable selection  of . Write SQ for the set of all q 2 SQ which can
be written in this form. Let E( ) =
S
q2SQ E(Gq) and I
( ) =
T
q2SQ E(Gq). As
I( ) \W  I( ) \W  E( ) \W  E( ) \W , just by definition, the following
result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.
Theorem 6. Let   = (N; (Ti; Ai;i; ui)i2N ; ;) be a game with indeterminate out-
comes. Suppose that   is -virtually continuous and -strongly indeterminate. Then
E( ) \W = I( ) \W 6= ;.
Such a result does not hold in general as shown by Jackson, Simon, Swinkels, and
Zame (2002). Thus the conditions of virtual continuity and strong indeterminacy are
important in Theorem 6.
Note, however, that, in contrast with both Jackson, Simon, Swinkels, and Zame
(2002) and Jackson and Swinkels (2005), Theorem 6 does not require players’ payoﬀ
function to be aﬃne in the outcome. Such feature is important as it allows one to
cover applications such as Bayesian version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth competition
setting of Section 4.1.
We remark that Theorem 6 is important because the type of a player may be his
own private information, and because with selections of the payoﬀ correspondence
that are obtained via selections of the outcome correspondence no issues concerning
type revelation arise.
We illustrate Theorem 5 with two examples. In both of them the next theorem,
which provides a way to show that virtual continuity holds in a wide class of games
with indeterminate outcomes, is used.
Theorem 7. Fix ` 2 Nnf0g and let   = (N; (Ti; Ai;i; ui)i2N ; ;) be a game with
indeterminate outcomes such that Ai  R` for all i 2 N . For each i 2 N , write
i =
n
a 2
Y
j2N
Aj : ai;h = aj;h0 for some j 2 N nfig and some 0  h; h0  `
o
:
Suppose the following:
(1) Ai is convex and has a non-empty interior for each i 2 N .
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(2) For each q 2 SQ, i 2 N , and  2 Mi  W i there is a 0i 2 Wi such that
qi(
0
i;  i)  qi().
(3) Di  T i for each i 2 N .
(4) For each i 2 N and each " > 0, there is a i-null set Ci  Ti, a measurable map
fi : graph(i) ! Ai and a correspondence i : graph(i) ! Ai, with measurable
graph, such that for each (ti; ai) 2 graph(i)\((TinCi)fi(graph(i)) the follow-
ing hold : (i) fi(ti; ai) 2 i(ti) and qi(ti; t i; fi(ti; ai); a i)  qi(ti; t i; ai; a i) for
each q 2 SQ and each (t i; a i) 2 T iA i, (ii) i(ti; ai)  i(ti), (iii) i(ti; ai)
is open, (iv) ai is a cluster point of i(ti; ai), and (v) for any a0i 2 i(ti; ai) and
any (t i; a i) 2 T i A i, if (ti; t i; ai; a i) 2 Di, and (ti; t i; a0i; a i) =2 Di, then
Qi(ti; t i; a0i; a i) > maxQi(ti; t i; ai; a i)   " (recall : #Qi(ti; t i; a0i; a i) = 1 if
(ti; t i; a0i; a i) =2 Di).
Then   is -virtually continuous.
Theorem 7 is analogous to Example 1. Beside some technical conditions (such as
(1)), it requires, in (2) and (3), that each player i has a best-reply in Wi against
strategies profiles in W i (which is, in fact, what is intended with i) and that his
payoﬀ correspondence is multi-valued only when his actions equals, in some coordi-
nate, the action of some other player. Condition (4) requires each player i to have, at
each (ti; ai) with ai 2 i(ti), a set of actions i(ti; ai) which he can use to avoid mul-
tiplicities while virtually guaranteeing the best possible payoﬀ. The following remark
elaborates on condition 4 of Theorem 7, whose proof is in Section A.5.10.
Remark 6. We now clarify what is intended with condition (4)(i). Without this
condition, the restriction that (4) imposes is only the requirement that (ii)–(iv) be
satisfied at the same time as (v). Condition (4)(i) helps in this regard as it allows to
reduce the set of points at which conditions (ii)-(v) need hold. Note, in particular, that
(i) does not impose any restriction in addition to those imposed by (ii)-(v), because
one can always set fi(ti; ai) = ai for each i 2 N and (ti; ai) 2 graph(i).
As a first application of Theorem 5, we consider a general contest with incomplete
information.
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Example 5. Consider the following game with indeterminate outcomes which models
a contest as formalized in Moldovanu and Sela (2001). There are n contestants i =
1; : : : ; n who compete for one of n prizes with values V1  V2      Vn  0.6 The
allocation of prizes is determined by the contestants’ eﬀort. For example, contestants
can be firms investing in R&D (their “eﬀort”) and prizes be their share of total
demand.
Contestants simultaneously choose an eﬀort level. Each contestant suﬀers a disu-
tility c(ti; ai) from his own eﬀort ai, where ti 2 ~T denotes his ability, ~T is a nonempty
compact subset of R+, and c : ~T  R+ ! R+ is continuous and satisfies c(ti; 0) = 0
for each ti 2 ~T . Abilities are drawn according to a probability measure  on ~T n,
which is absolutely continuous with respect to the product of its marginals, and each
contestant’s ability is his own private information. We assume that there is a > 0
such that V1 < c(t; a) for each t 2 ~T .7
For each i 2 N , let Ti = ~T and Ai = [0; a]. When all contestants choose diﬀerent
eﬀort levels, then the first prize goes to the player with the highest eﬀort, the second
prize goes to the player with the second highest eﬀort and so on. In case of ties in eﬀort
levels, randomization is used to determined the allocation of prizes. For example, if
players 1, 2 and 4 choose the highest eﬀort level, then the first three prizes are
randomly allocated to players 1, 2 and 4. We let H be the set of allocations, i.e.
the set of 1-1 functions from N (players) to N (prizes). The outcome space 
 is the
set of probability measures on H. Some notation is needed to define the outcome
correspondence. Given a 2 A, order the elements of the set fa1; : : : ; ang so that
a(1) >    > a(L(a)). For each l = 1; : : : ; L(a), set N (l)a = fi 2 N : ai = a(l)g and
n
(l)
a = #(N
(l)
a ); furthermore, define J (1)a = f1; : : : ; n(1)a g and, for each 1 < l  L(a),
J
(l)
a = fn(l 1)a + 1; : : : ; n(l 1)a + n(l)a g. Given a 2 A, the set of feasible allocations is
denoted by H(a) and consists of those h 2 H with the property that, for each i 2 N ,
6The assumption that the number of prizes equals the number of contestants is without loss of
generality. Indeed, the case where there are p < n prizes, which is allowed in Moldovanu and Sela
(2001), is identified with Vj = 0 for all j = p+ 1; : : : ; n.
7Moldovanu and Sela (2001) assume that ~T = [m; 1] for some 0 < m < 1, c(ti; ai) = ti(ai)
where  : R+ ! R+ is strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable and satisfies (0) = 0. The existence of
a then follows when  is linear or convex. Note also that, unlike Moldovanu and Sela (2001), we do
not assume that types are independent with a continuous and strictly positive density.
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if 1  l  L(a) is such that ai = a(l) then hi 2 J (l)a . We then define  : A! 
 in this
context by setting, for each a 2 A,
(a) = f! 2 
 : !h = 0 for each h 62 H(a)g:
The payoﬀ of contestant i 2 N equals the expected value of the prize received minus
his disutility of eﬀort; thus contestant i’s payoﬀ function ui : T A
! R is given
by ui(t; a; !) =
P
h2H(a) !hVhi   c(ti; ai).
Evidently, we have
X
i2N
ui(t; a; !) =
nX
i=1
Vi  
nX
i=1
c(ti; ai)
for each t 2 T , a 2 A, and ! 2 (a). This implies easily that the game   just defined
is strongly indeterminate.
We next show that   is virtually continuous by using Theorem 7 with i(ti) = Ai
for each i 2 N and ti 2 Ti (so that Wi = Mi). It is clear that conditions (1)–(3) in
Theorem 7 hold. As for condition (4), fix i 2 N and " > 0. Let Ci = ; for each i 2 N .
Let  2 (0; a) be such that V1 < c(t; a) for each a > a   , and define fi by setting,
for each (ti; ai) 2 Ti  Ai,
fi(ti; ai) =
8><>:ai if ai  a  ;0 otherwise:
Then (i) of condition (4) in Theorem 7 holds. Note that fi(Ti  Ai)  [0; a  ]. Let
 2 (0; ) be such that jc(t; a)   c(t; a0)j < " whenever ja   a0j < , a; a0 2 [0; a] and
t 2 ~T , and define i by setting
i(ti; ai) =
8><>:(ai; ai + ) if ai  a  ;Ai otherwise
for each (ti; ai) 2 Ti  Ai. Clearly i has a measurable graph and (ii)–(iv) of con-
dition (4) in Theorem 7 are satisfied. As for (v) of that condition, let ti 2 Ti,
ai 2 fi(TiAi), a0i 2 i(ti; ai), (t i; a i) 2 T iA i and suppose (ti; t i; ai; a i) 2 Di
and (ti; t i; a0i; a i) 62 Di. Let l 2 f1; : : : ; L(a)g be such that ai = a(l) and let
l0 2 f1; : : : ; L(a0i; a i)g be such that a0i = (a0i; a i)(l0). Since a0i > ai, we must have
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min J
(l0)
(a0i;a i)
 max J (l)a . Therefore
Qi(ti; t i; a0i; a i) maxQi(ti; t i; ai; a i)
= V
min J
(l0)
(a0
i
;a i)
  V
max J
(l)
a
  c(ti; a0i) + c(ti; ai) >  ";
as desired.
By Theorems 5 we conclude that E( ) = I( ) 6= ;.
The next theorem provides a way to see that strong indeterminacy holds in a wide
class of games with indeterminate outcomes.
Theorem 8. Let   = (N; (Ti; Ai;i; ui)i2N ; ;) be a game with indeterminate out-
comes. Suppose that, for some ` 2 Nnf0g, Ai; Ti  R` for each i 2 N . Let i be as
in the statement of Theorem 7 and suppose (2) of Theorem 7 is satisfied. For each
i 2 N and each 1  h  `, let fi;h : Ai;h ! R be a measurable function such that
fi;h(ai;h)  ti;h whenever ai 2 i(ti). For each i 2 N and each 1  h  `, write
i;h = f(t; a) 2 T  A : ai;h = aj;h0 ; j 6= i; 0  h0  `g:
Suppose the following:
(a) Q(t; a) = Qe(t; a) if (t; a) 2 T  A is such that ai 2 i(ti) for each i 2 N and
such that (t; a) 2 i;h implies fi;h(ai;h) > ti;h, i 2 N , 1  h  `.
(b) i(fti;hg  Ti; h) = 0 for each i 2 N , ti 2 Ti, and 0  h  `.
Then   is -strongly indeterminate.
Theorem 8, whose proof is in Section A.5.11, covers situations where  is defined
via thresholds fi;h(ai;h)  ti;h (i 2 N and 1  h  `), for instance as when one
considers, in auctions or Bertrand competition, the closure of the set of undominated
actions for each type of each player. Moreover, in such examples, the threshold also
means that player i strictly prefer to receive the hth object or to sell more of com-
modity h whenever fi;h(ai;h) > ti;h. Thus, if there is a tie between, say, players 1 and
2 due to a1;h = a2;h0 and both f1;h(a1;h) > t1;h and f2;h(a2;h0) > t2;h0 hold, then there
are multiple possible payoﬀs for players 1 and 2 but all of them are eﬃcient.
Condition (a) of Theorem 8 covers situations of the above kind. It is not suﬃcent
for -strong indeterminacy as Example 3 with an asymmetric complete-information
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Betrand duopoly shows. Condition (b) fills the gap by requiring marginal type distri-
butions to be atomless in each coordinate.
As a second application of Theorem 5, we consider a Bertrand oligopoly with
incomplete information.
Example 6. Consider a Bertrand oligopoly with linear cost functions and one com-
modity whose demand is d(x) where x is the lowest price in the market and d :
R+ ! R+ is a continuous function. There is incomplete information regarding firms’
marginal costs. For some a > 0 and each firm i 2 N , let Ai = [0; a] and Ti be a
compact subset of R+. Let  be a probability measure on T which is absolutely con-
tinuous with respect to the product of its marginals and such that i is atomless for
each i 2 N . The outcomes of the game are the fractions of total demand that each
firm gets. Thus, we let the outcome space 
 be f! 2 [0; 1]n : Pi2N !i = 1g, with
the interpretation that !i 2 [0; 1] is the fraction of total demand that firm i satisfies,
i 2 N . The natural choice of the outcome correspondence  : A ! 
 in the context
is given by setting, for each a 2 A,
(a) =

! 2 
 : !i > 0 only if ai = min
j2N
aj for each i 2 N

:
The payoﬀ functions ui : T  A 
! R are then given by
ui(t; a; !) = !id

min
j2N
aj

(ai   ti)
for each i 2 N . Finally, let i(ti) = fai 2 Ai : ai  tig, i.e. i(ti) is the set of prices
above marginal cost, which we assume to be nonempty.
To see that the game   just defined is virtually continuous, we check that the
hypotheses of Theorem 7 are satisfied. Clearly conditions (1) and (3) of that theorem
are satisfied. As for condition (2), without loss of generality consider player 1. Fix
q 2 SQ and  2 M . By Lemma 11 there is a measurable map g : T1 ! A1 such
that q1(g;  i)  q1(). Define h : T1 ! A1 by setting h(t1) = maxfg(t1); t1g. Then
h 2 W1. Moreover, we have q1(t1; t 1; h(t1); a 1)  q1(t1; t 1; g(t1); a 1) for each
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(t1; t 1; a 1) 2 T1  T 1  A 1, so
q1(h;  1) =
Z
T
Z
A
q1(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) dh(t1)  1(t 1) d(t)
=
Z
T
Z
A1
q1(t1; t 1; h(t1); a 1) d 1(t 1) d(t)

Z
T
Z
A1
q1(t1; t 1; g(t1); a 1) d 1(t 1) d(t)
=
Z
T
Z
A
q1(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) dg(t1)  1(t 1) d(t)
= q1(g;  1)  q1(1;  1):
Thus condition (2) of Theorem 7 holds. To see that condition (4) of that theorem
holds, fix " > 0 and i 2 N . Let  > 0 be such that jd(a0i)(a0i   ti)  d(ai)(ai   ti)j < "
whenever ti 2 Ti and ai; a0i 2 Ai are such that ja0i   aij < . Let Ci = fag \ Ti, and
note that i(Ci) = 0 because i is atomless. Let fi(ti; ai) = ai for each i 2 N and
(ti; ai) 2 graph(i). Define the correspondence i : graph(i)! Ai by setting
i(ti; ai) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(maxfti; ai   g; ai) if ai > ti
(ai; a) if ai = ti < a
fag if ai = ti = a :
Then fi and i satisfy the requirements in (4) of Theorem 7 for the given i and ". As
i 2 N and " > 0 are arbitrary, (4) of Theorem 7 is satisfied.
Thus, by Theorem 7,   is -virtually continuous. For each i 2 N , define a map
hi : Ai ! R by setting hi(ai) = ai. Using Theorem 8, with ` = 1 and fi;1 = hi for
each i 2 N , we see that   is -strongly indeterminate. Now by Theorem 5 we can
conclude that I( ) \W = E( ) \W 6= ;.
Remark 7. It is straightforward to generalize the above example to the case of more
than one commodity by using the full generality of Theorem 7 with ` > 1. It is also
interesting to contrast the conclusion of the above Bertrand example with Example
3. In both examples, the two firms have asymmetric costs with probability one; how-
ever, invariance of the equilibrium set holds in Example 6 but not in Example 3.
The diﬀerence is that the possible types of each firm are distributed atomlessly in
Example 6, so that Theorem 8 applies to yield strong indeterminacy, which is not the
case in the other example.
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A Appendix
A.1 Lemmata
This section contains some preliminary lemmata. Let   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) be a game
with an endogenous sharing rule.
Lemma 4. Di is measurable for each i 2 N .
Proof. Because Q is uhc with non-empty and compact values, there is a sequence
hqkik2N of measurable selections of Q such that fqk(x) : k 2 Ng is dense in Q(x) for
each x 2 X (see Castaing and Valadier (1977, Corollary III.3, p. 63 and Theorem III.6,
p. 65)). Now, for each i 2 N , X nDi = fx 2 X : qk;i(x) = q0;i(x) for all k 2 Ng.
For convenience of later reference, we record the following fact in form of a lemma;
the lemma implies in particular that SQe 6= ; (consider f(r) =
P
i2N ri).
Lemma 5. If f : Rn ! R is continuous, then there is a q 2 SQ such that, for each
x 2 X, f(q(x)) = maxr2Q(x) f(r)
Proof. Use Aliprantis and Border (2006, 18.2, 18.19 and 18.20).
Recall that the -algebra of the universally measurable subsets of X equals
T
 B,
where the intersection is over all the Borel probability measures  onX and B denotes
the -completion of the Borel -algebra.8 Each Borel probability measures  on X
has an unique extension to the universally measurable subsets of X, which we also
denote by .
Lemma 6. Dei is universally measurable for each i 2 N .
Proof. (a) By Lemma 5, Qe has nonempty values; we now show that graph(Qe)
is a Borel subset of X  RN . To see this, set A = RN and B = RN , and for each
m 2 Nnf0g let
Gm = f(x; a; b) 2 X  AB : a; b 2 Q(x); b  a; bi  ai + 1=m for some i 2 Ng:
8It is easy to see that this definition is equivalent to Castaing and Valadier (1977, Definition 21,
p. 73) where the intersection is over all the Borel positive bounded measures  on X.
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Let Hm be the projection of Gm onto X A. Because Q is uhc with compact values,
Gm is compact, and hence so is Hm. Now graph(Qe) = graph(Q)n
S
m2Nnf0gHm.
(b) By Castaing and Valadier (1977, Theorem III.22, p. 74), it follows from (a)
that there is a sequence hqkik2N of universally measurable selections of Q such that
the set fqk(x) : k 2 Ng is dense in Q(x) for each x 2 X. Now, for each i 2 N ,
X nDei = fx 2 X : qk;i(x) = q0;i(x) for all k 2 Ng.
A.2 Virtual continuous games
Let   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) be a game with an endogenous sharing rule. One aspect of
Example 1 is that Dirac measures (i.e., pure strategies) are taken for the i’s of the
definition of virtual continuity. In Lemma 7 below it is shown that this is always
possible.
Lemma 7.   is virtually continuous if and only if for each q 2 SQ, i 2 N , " > 0 and
 2M , there exists xi 2 Xi such that (xi ; i)(Di) < " and qi(xi;  i) > qi()  ".
Proof. The suﬃciency part is obvious. For the necessity part, fix 0 < " < 1 and i 2 N .
Choose a  0 so that qi(x)+a > 0 for all x 2 X. Set k = maxf1; supfqi(x) : x 2 Xgg
and "0 = "2=(2(k + a)). Note that "0  "=2.
Virtual continuity gives a i so that (i; i)(Di) < "0 and qi(i;  i) > qi()  "0.
Let E = fxi 2 Xi :  i(Di;xi)  "g where Di;xi  X i is the section of Di at xi. By
Fubini’s theorem, i(E) < "0=". Thus i(E) < "=(2(k + a)) by the choice of " and "0.
Now, again using Fubini’s theorem,Z
XinE
Z
X i
(qi(xi; x i) + a) d i(x i) di(xi)
> qi() + a  "0  
Z
E
Z
X i
(qi(xi; x i) + a) d i(x i) di(xi)
 qi() + a  "0   i(E)(k + a)
 qi() + a  "=2  "=2
= qi() + a  ":
There must therefore be an xi 2 XinE such that
i(XinE)
Z
X i
(qi(xi; x i) + a) d i(x i) > qi() + a  ":
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Because
R
X i
(qi(xi; x i) + a) d i(x i)  0 by the choice of a, it follows thatZ
X i
(qi(xi; x i) + a) d i(x i) > qi() + a  "
and hence that
R
X i
qi(xi; x i) d i(x i) > qi() ". Finally, we have (xi ; i)(Di) < "
because xi 2 XinE.
Lemma 7 implies that virtual continuity in mixed strategies implies virtual conti-
nuity in pure strategies (see Remark 3 for the definition of the latter). However, the
converse does not hold, as the following example shows.
Example 7. Suppose N = f1; 2g and X1 = X2 = [0; 1]. Define a correspondence
Q1 : X ! R by setting
Q1(x1; x2) =
8><>:[0; 1] if   1=4 + x1  x2  1=4 + x1f1g otherwise.
Define a correspondence Q2 : X ! R by setting Q2(x) = f0g for all x 2 X. Let
Q = Q1 Q2. Evidently virtual continuity holds for pure strategies. But if 2 is the
restriction of Lebesgue measure to the Borel sets of [0; 1], then (D1)  1=4 for all
1 2M1, so virtual continuity fails for mixed strategies.
The next result is used in our treatment of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition.
Lemma 8. Let   = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q) be such that Xi = A for each i 2 N , where A is
a perfect compact subset of Rm, m  1. For each i 2 N , write
i =
n
x 2 X : xi = xj for some j 2 N nfig
o
:
Suppose the following:
(1) Di  i for each i 2 N .
(2) Given " > 0, i 2 N and xi 2 A, there is an open subset i(xi) of A such that
(i) xi is a cluster point of i(xi), (ii) whenever ai 2 i(xi) and x i 2 An 1 are
such that (xi; x i) 2 Di and (ai; x i) =2 Di, then Qi(ai; x i) > maxQi(xi; x i)  "
(recall that #(Qi(ai; x i)) = 1 if (ai; x i) =2 Di).
Then virtual continuity holds.
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Proof. To see this, consider any q 2 SQ,  2 M , " > 0, and i 2 N . Without loss of
generality, take i = 1 and let x1 2 A be such that
q1(x1 ;  1)  q1():
(i) For each k 2 Nnf0g there is ak 2 A such that
(a) (ak ; 1)(D1) = 0 and
(b) jjak   x1jj < 1=k.
To see this, first observe that the set E = fa1 2 A :  1(1;a1) = 0g is dense,
writing 1;a1 for the section of 1 at a1. Indeed, for each i 2 N nf1g, the set of
all r 2 Rm such that  1(fx 1 2 An 1 : xi = rg) > 0 is countable. Now if a1 =2 E
there must be i 2 N nf1g such that  1(fx 1 2 An 1 : xi = a1g) > 0. Thus AnE is
countable. Because A is perfect, every point of A is a condensation point for A, and
the claim about E follows.
Now for each k 2 Nnf0g, choose ak 2 1(x1) \ E such that (b) holds; such ak
exist by condition (2)(i), because E is dense and 1(x1) is open. As for (a), note
that we have
(ak ; 1)(D1)  (ak ; 1)(1) =  1(1;ak) = 0
for each k, because ak 2 E.
(ii) Using Fubini’s theorem and the fact that the countable union of null sets is
a null set, we see from (b) that for  1-a.e. x 1 2 A 1 we have ak(D1;x 1) = 0 for
the x 1-section of D1, i.e., (ak; x 1) =2 D1, for all k 2 Nnf0g. Hence, from (2)(ii), and
because (x1; x 1) is a continuity point of q1 whenever (x1; x 1) =2 D1, we must have
lim
k!1
q1(ak; x 1)  q1(x1; x 1)  "
for  1-a.e. x 1 2 An 1. It follows that
lim
k!1
q1(ak ;  1) = lim
k!1
Z
An 1
q1(ak; x 1) d 1(x 1)

Z
An 1
q1(x1; x 1) d 1(x 1)  " = q1()  ";
by Fatou’s lemma. Thus, by (i)(a), and as " > 0 is arbitrary, the requirements of
virtual continuity are satisfied for player 1.
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Returning to the definition of virtual continuity, it would of course be more in-
tuitive, and for typical applications probably also suﬃcient (this is actually the case
for the applications we will consider in this paper), to require (i; i)(Di) = 0 in the
definition of virtual continuity, rather than just (i; i)(Di) < " for " > 0. However,
the “(i; i)(Di) < "”-clause adds some generality.
Example 8. Let N = f1; 2g, and X1 = X2 = [0; 1]. Define a correspondence
Q1 : X ! R by setting
Q1(x1; x2) =
8><>:[0; 1] if x1  x2  x1=2 + 1=2 or x1 = 1f1g otherwise:
Define a correspondenceQ2 : X ! R by settingQ2(x) = f0g, x 2 X. LetQ = Q1Q2.
Then Q is uhc with non-empty compact values, and
D1 = fx 2 X : x1  x2  x1=2 + 1=2g [ fx 2 X : x1 = 1g:
Pick any q 2 SQ. Of course, the requirements of virtual continuity are satisfied for
i = 2. Consider i = 1. Pick any 2 2 M2. Let x1;k, k 2 N, be such that x1;k < 1 for
all k but x1;k ! 1. Then, by the choice of Q, (x1;k ;2)(D1)! 0 and q1(x1;k ; 2)! 1,
from which we can see that the requirements of virtual continuity are satisfied for
i = 1. However, if 2 has full support, then (1;2)(D1) > 0 for all 1 2M1.
Remark 8. Example 8 shows, in particular, that our definition of virtual continuity
allows the sets Di to be quite large. In fact, in that example, D1 has a non-empty in-
terior.
Lemma 9. Give M the narrow topology. Then virtual continuity implies that each
q 2 SQ is mixed strategy payoﬀ secure, i.e., for all  2 M , i 2 N , and " > 0 there is
a i 2Mi and a neighborhood V of  such that qi(i; 0 i) > qi()  " for all 0 2 V .
Proof. Fix q 2 SQ,  2 M , i 2 N , and " > 0. Recall that q 2 SQ is such that
q
i
(x) = minr2Q(x) ri for each x 2 X and let vi = vqi . Let i 2 Mi be such that
q
i
(i;  i) > vi() "=2. Noting that x 7! qi(x) is lsc (see Aliprantis and Border (2006,
Lemma 17.30)) and, hence, so is  7! q
i
() (see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem
32
15.5), let V be an open neighborhood of  such that q
i
(i; 
0
 i) > qi(i;  i)  "=2 for
all 0 2 V . Hence, for each 0 2 O,
qi()  vqi() = vi() < qi(i;  i) +
"
2
< q
i
(i; 
0
 i) + "  qi(i; 0 i) + ":
Lemma 10. Let M be given the narrow topology. Then virtual continuity implies that
vqi is continuous for each q 2 SQ and each i 2 N .
Proof. Fix q 2 SQ and i 2 N . By Lemma 9 we can see that vqi is lower semicontinuous.
By Lemma 5 there is a q0 2 Sq such that q0i is upper semicontinuous and, thus, vq0i is
also upper semicontinuous. By Lemma 2, vqi is upper semicontinuous.
We conclude this section with an example showing that the converse of Lemma 2
does not hold.
Example 9. Let N = f1; 2g, and X1 = X2 = [0; 1]. Define a correspondence
Q1 : X ! R by setting
Q1(x) =
8><>:[x1; 1] if x1 < 1;[x2; 1] if x1 = 1:
Define a correspondenceQ2 : X ! R by settingQ2(x) = f0g, x 2 X. LetQ = Q1Q2.
Then Q is uhc with non-empty compact values, and D1 = X n f(1; 1)g. If 2 = 0,
then (D1) = 1 for any 1, hence virtual continuity fails. However, there exists a
common value function: For each q 2 SQ, vq2  0 and vq1  1. Indeed, for the latter,
note that, as xk1 ! 1 from below, q1(xk1; 2)  xk1 ! 1.
A.3 Young measures
In this section we establish a result on Young measures that is needed for our main
results.
Lemma 11. In the context and notation of Section 5, let  = (1; : : : ; n) 2 M
and q : T  A ! R be a bounded measurable function. Then, for any i 2 N , there
is a measurable map g : Ti ! Ai such that g(ti) 2 supp(i(ti)) for i-a.e. in Ti and
q(g;  i)  q(i;  i).
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Proof. Without loss of generality consider i = 1. Assume first that q(t; a)  0 for
all (t; a) 2 T  A. For each t 1 2 T 1 write () 1 (t 1) for the product measure on
A 1 defined from the measures 2(t2); : : : ; n(tn). Write 
()
 1 for the product measure
on T 1 defined from the measures 2; : : : ; n, and 
()
 1 for the uniquely determined
probability measure on T 1A 1 such that  () 1 (CB) =
R
C

()
 1 (t 1)(B) d
()
 1 (t 1)
for each C 2 B(T 1) and B 2 B(A 1). Let  : T ! R+ be a Radon-Nikodym derivative
of  with respect to 1 : : :n. Define ~q : TA! R+ by setting ~q(t; a) = (t)q(t; a)
for each (t; a) 2 T  A. In the sequel of this proof, Tonelli’s theorem (in its ordinary
and generalized version; see Neveu (1965, Proposition III.2.1)) is used repeatedly and
invoked without explicit reference.
Note that whenever O  A1 is open, then for any t1 2 T1, supp(1(t1)) \ O 6= ;
if and only if 1(t1)(O) > 0. Therefore, by the definition of Young measure, for
such sets O, the set ft1 2 T1 : supp(1(t1)) \O 6= ;g is measurable. Using Castaing
and Valadier (1977, Proposition III.13, p. 69), this implies that the correspondence
t1 7! supp(1(t1)) : T1 ! A1 has a measurable graph. Next note that the maps
h : T1 ! R+ [ f+1g and h1 : T1  A1 ! R+ [ f+1g, defined by setting
h(t1) =
Z
A1
Z
T 1
Z
A 1
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) d
()
 1 (t 1)(a 1) d
()
 1 (t 1) d1(t1)(a1)
and
h1(t1; a1) =
Z
T 1
Z
A 1
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) d
()
 1 (t 1)(a 1) d
()
 1 (t 1)
respectively, are measurable. It follows that the correspondence F : T1 ! A1, defined
by setting
F (t1) =
8><>:supp(1(t1)) \ fa1 2 A1 : h1(t1; a1)  h(t1)  0g if h1(t1) <1A1 otherwise,
has a measurable graph. Clearly F (t1) 6= ; for all t1 2 T1. Using Castaing and Valadier
(1977, III.22, p. 74), there is a universally measurable map g0 such that g0(t1) 2 F (t1)
for all t1 2 T1. Observe that the set

t1 2 T1 :
R
T 1
(t1; t 1) d
()
 1 (t 1) = +1
	
is
a 1-null set, so the same must be true of the set ft1 2 T1 : h(t1) = +1g because
q is bounded. Modifying g0 on a 1-null set, if necessary, we can therefore find a
measurable map g : T1 ! A1 such that
R
T1
h1(t1; g(t1)) d1(t1) 
R
T1
h(t1) d1(t1) and
g(t1) 2 supp(1(t1)) for 1-a.e. t1 2 T1.
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Now, for each fixed t1 2 T1,Z
A1(T 1A 1)
~q(t1; ) d1(t1)  () 1
=
Z
A1
Z
T 1A 1
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) d
()
 1 (t 1; a 1) d1(t1)(a1)
=
Z
T 1A 1
Z
A1
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) d1(t1)(a1) d
()
 1 (t 1; a 1) :
Consequently,
q(1;  1)
=
Z
T1T 1
Z
A
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) d1(t1) () 1 (t 1)(a1; a 1) d1  () 1 (t1; t 1)
=
Z
T1
Z
T 1
Z
A
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) d1(t1) () 1 (t 1)(a1; a 1) d() 1 (t 1) d1(t1)
=
Z
T1
Z
T 1
Z
A 1
Z
A1
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) d1(t1)(a1) d
()
 1 (t 1)(a 1) d
()
 1 (t 1) d1(t1)
=
Z
T1
Z
T 1A 1
Z
A1
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) d1(t1)(a1) d
()
 1 (t 1; a 1) d1(t1)
=
Z
T1
Z
A1
Z
T 1A 1
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) d
()
 1 (t 1; a 1) d1(t1)(a1) d1(t1)
=
Z
T1
Z
A1
Z
T 1
Z
A 1
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) d
()
 1 (t 1)(a 1) d
()
 1 (t 1) d1(t1)(a1) d1(t1)
=
Z
T1
h(t1) d1(t1)

Z
T1
h1(t1; g(t1)) d1(t1)
=
Z
T1
Z
T 1
Z
A 1
~q(t1; t 1; g(t); a 1) d
()
 1 (t 1)(a 1) d
()
 1 (t 1) d1(t1)
=
Z
T1
Z
T 1
Z
A
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) dg(t1) () 1 (t 1)(a1; a 1) d() 1 (t 1) d1(t1)
=
Z
T1T 1
Z
A
~q(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) dg(t1) () 1 (t 1)(a1; a 1) d1  () 1 (t1; t 1)
= q(g;  1):
Thus the lemma is true whenever q is non-negative. But this implies that the lemma
is true for any bounded q, by the fact that if f : T A! R is constant-valued, then
f(1;  1) = f(01;  1) for any 01 2M1.
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A.4 Spaces of Young measures
Fix a probability space (T;; ) and a Polish space X, and let R denote the set of
all Young measures from T to X.
A Carathéodory integrand on T  X, with control measure , is a measurable
function q : T X ! R such that q(t; ) is continuous for each t 2 T and such that for
some -integrable q : T ! R+, supfjq(t; x)j : x 2 Xg  q(t) for each t 2 T . Write
G for the set of all such functions. Now the narrow topology for Young measures on
R, with  as control measure, is the coarsest topology on R such that for each q 2 G
the functional
 7!
Z
T
Z
X
q(t; x)d(t)(x)d(t) : R! R
is continuous. With this topology, R becomes a subset of a locally convex topological
vector space (see Balder (2002, Step 2, p. 462)). It should be noted that, in general,
the narrow topology for Young measures is not a Hausdorﬀ topology.
If  : T ! X is a correspondence, then R denotes the subset of R defined by
setting
R = f 2 R : supp((t))  (t) for almost all t 2 Tg:
The following theorem gathers several properties of the space R (see Carmona and
Podczeck (2014, Theorem 10) for a proof).
Theorem 9. Let  : T ! X be a correspondence with measurable graph such that
(t) is non-empty and compact for all t 2 T . Give R the narrow topology for Young
measures, with  as control measure. Then the subset R of R is non-empty, convex,
closed, compact, and sequentially compact.
Now for each i = 1; : : : ; n, let (Ti;i; i) be a probability measure, Xi a Polish
space, and write Ri for the set of all Young measures from Ti to Xi. Set X =
Qn
i=1Xi,
T =
Qn
i=1 Ti, and  =
Nn
i=1i. Let R be the set of all Young measures from T to
X, and g :
Q
i2N Ri !R the map defined by setting
g(1; : : : n)(t) = 1(t1)     n(tn); t 2 T;
for all (1; : : : n) 2
Q
i2N Ri. Write () for the product measure defined from the
measures i, i = 1; : : : ; n, and let  be any probability measure on (T;). For each
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i = 1; : : : ; n, give Ri the narrow topology for Young measures, with i as control
measure. Write R for R endowed with the narrow topology for Young measures,
taking  as control measure, and R() for R endowed with the narrow topology for
Young measures, taking () as control measure. Then the following three lemmata
are true.
Lemma 12. The map g is continuous.
Proof. Using induction, this follows from Balder (1988, Theorem 2.5).
Lemma 13. If  is absolutely continuous with respect to (), then the identity from
R() to R is continuous.
Proof. Let h be a Radon-Nikodym derivative of  with respect to (). Note that
if q is a Carathéodory integrand on T  X with control measure , then q  h is a
Carathéodory integrand on T X with control measure ().
Lemma 14. Suppose that T is a Polish space, and that  is the Borel -algebra. Give
M(T X) the narrow topology. Then the function  7!  from R to M(T X) is
continuous.
Proof. Let c : T  X ! R be bounded and continuous. Then c is a Carathéodory
integrand on T X. SinceZ
cd =
Z
T
Z
A
c(t; a)d(t)(a)

d(t);
the result follows.
A.5 Proofs
This section contains the proofs of the results in the main text.
A.5.1 Proof of Example 1
Consider any q 2 SQ,  2M , " > 0, and i 2 f1; 2g. Without loss of generality, take i =
1. Using Fubini’s theorem, we can find an x1 2 [0; 1] such that
R
[0;1]
q1(x1; x2) d2(x2) 
q1(). For any x1 2 X1, write D1;x1 for the section of D1 at x1. If 2(D1;x1) = 0, then
(x1 ;2)(D1) = 0, and we are done by taking x1 for 1. Otherwise, let x be the unique
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point in D1 determined by x1, and choose C1(x) corresponding to " and x according
to the hypotheses above. By (i) there is a sequence hx1;ki in C1(x) with x1;k ! x1
such that 2(D1;x1;k) = 0 for each k, because D1  . Now (x1;k ;2)(D1) = 0 for all k.
Moreover, because each x 2 XnD1 is a continuity point of q1, (ii) and Fatou’s lemma
ensure that q1(x1;k ; 2) > q1()  " if k is large.
Remark 9. It should be obvious that in Example 1 one may take any compact metric
spaces (which need not be the same) for X1 and X2, and for  any subset of X1X2
such that the sections x1 = fx2 2 X2 : (x1; x2) 2 g and x2 = fx1 2 X1 :
(x1; x2) 2 g are empty or singletons for each x1 2 X1 and x2 2 X2.
A.5.2 Proof of Lemma 1
The “only if” part is true because for each i 2 N there is a q 2 SQ (which may
depend on i) such that qi(x) = mi(x) for all x 2 X (see Lemma 5). For the “if”
part, let i 2 N , q 2 SQ, " > 0 and  2 M be given. Since X is compact and
Q is uhc and takes compact values, there is a number B such that jjyjj  B for
all y 2 Q(x) and x 2 X. Let  > 0 be such that (1 + 2B) < ". By hypothesis,
there is a i 2 Mi such that mi() < mi(i;  i) +  and (i; i)(Di) < . Now
mi(i;  i)  qi(i;  i) =
R
Di
(mi   qi)d(i; i) < 2B, so
qi()  mi() < mi(i;  i) +  < qi(i;  i) + (1 + 2B) < qi(i;  i) + ":
Also, (i; i)(Di) < ". Thus the “if” part follows.
A.5.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Fix i 2 N and  2M . Let " > 0 and H = fi 2Mi : (i; i)(Di) < "g. Consider any
q, q0 2 SQ. Then, by virtual continuity, since q, q0 agree on X nDi,
jvqi()  vq0i()j =
 sup
i2H
qi(i;  i)  sup
i2H
q0i(i;  i)
  "2B
where B as in the proof of Lemma 1. As " is arbitrary, vqi() = vq0i().
A.5.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Define an endogenous sharing rule game  0 = (N; (Xi)i2N ; Q0) by letting Q0(x) be the
convex hull of Q(x) for each x 2 X. (By Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 17.35,
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p. 573), Q0 is uhc and takes non-empty compact values, as required by our definition
of a game with an endogenous sharing rule.)
Using Lemma 1, we can see that virtual continuity of   implies virtual continuity
of  0, because maxr2Q(x) ri = maxr2Q0(x) ri. Also we have SQe \ SQ0e 6= ; (consider a
q 2 SQ such that q(x) solves maxr2Q(x)
P
i2N ri for each x 2 X).
Now by Simon and Zame (1990), E( 0) 6= ;, so by the previous paragraph and
Theorem 1, E( ) 6= ;, and in particular, E(Gq) 6= ; for every q 2 SQe .
A.5.5 Proof of Theorem 3
That f 2 E( ) : (Di) = 0 for all i 2 Ng  I( ) is immediate from Lemma 2.
For the reverse inclusion, consider any i 2 N . There are q, q 2 SQ such that for
every x 2 X, qi(x) = maxr2Q(x) ri and qi(x) = minr2Q(x) ri (see Lemma 5). Now if
 2M is such that (Di) > 0, then qi() > qi(), so by Lemma 2,  =2 I( ).
A.5.6 Proof of Theorem 4
(i) Given  2 M and i 2 N , if (Dei ) > 0, then there are q, ~q 2 SQe such that
qi() 6= ~qi(). Indeed, as shown in the proof of Lemma 6, Qe has a measurable
graph and nonempty values, so by Castaing and Valadier (1977, Theorem III.22)
that there is a sequence hhkik2N of (Borel) measurable functions hk : X ! Rn and
a Borel set Y  X with (Y ) = 0 such that fhk(x) : k 2 Ng is a dense subset of
Qe(x) for all x 2 XnY . Modify each hk on Y so that it becomes a member of SQe
(by making it equal to q on Y for some q 2 SQe ; recall that SQe 6= ;). Because
Dei belongs to the -completion of the Borel -algebra of X, if (Dei ) > 0 then
there a Borel set H  Dei with (H) > 0. Set H 0 = H nY . Then also (H 0) > 0.
Note that fhk;i(x) : k 2 Ng is a dense subset of Qe;i(x) for each x 2 H 0. Hence,
#(fhk;i(x) : k 2 Ng) > 1 for all x 2 H 0. Thus for some k 2 Nnf0g and some Borel set
B  H 0 with (B) > 0 we have hk;i(x) > h0;i(x) for all x 2 B, or for some k 2 Nnf0g
and some Borel set B  H 0 with (B) > 0 we have hk;i(x) < h0;i(x) for all x 2 B.
In either case, set q = h0 and ~q = 1Bhk + 1XnBh0.
(ii) Virtual continuity, Theorem 1, and Lemma 2 combine to say that whenever
 2 E( ) and q, ~q 2 SQe , then qi() = ~qi(). Thus (ii) yields part 1.
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(iii) If Di = Dei for each i 2 N , then part 1 and Theorem 3 imply that I( ) =
E( ).
A.5.7 Proof of Lemma 3
(i) Given z 2 bd(A), there is a p 2 S such that pz  pa for all a 2 A and such
that z   p 2 A for all  > 0 suﬃciently small. Indeed, let C be the set of all
p 2 Rm such that pz  pa for all a 2 A. Then C convex, with 0 2 C. We must have
(z   C) \ int(A) 6= ;. Otherwise, as int(A) 6= ;, there would be a non-zero v 2 Rm
such that va  v(z  p) for all a 2 A and p 2 C, by the separation theorem. The fact
that 0 2 C implies that v 2 C, and the fact that z 2 A implies that vp  0 for all
p 2 C. But these implications contradict each other because v 6= 0 means vv > 0.
(ii) The map  is continuous. To see this, suppose pk ! p in S and zk ! z in A.
Set Bk = fa 2 A : pka < pkzkg and B = fa 2 A : pa < pzg. Observe that
1\
m=0
1[
km
B 4Bk  fa 2 A : pa = pzg:
Because  is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, it follows that
(B 4Bk)! 0, and therefore that (Bk)! (B).
(iii) Using (ii) we see that Q is closed. As for virtual continuity, wlog consider
player 1. Suppose that x1 = x2 = z 2 int(A). Let (r1; r2) 2 Q(x1; x2), and let p 2 S
be such that r1 = (p; z). As x1 2 int(A), we have x = x1 p 2 A for all suﬃciently
small  > 0. Now, for such ,
u1(x; x2) = 
 
x2 x1+p
kx2 x1+pk ;
1
2
(x1 + p+ x2)

= (p; z + 1
2
p);
and by (ii), (p; z+ 1
2
p)! (p; z) as ! 0, so u1(x; x2)! r1 as ! 0. This holds,
in particular, if r1 = maxfr01 : (r01; r02) 2 Q(x1; x2)g.
Suppose next that x1 = x2 = z 2 bd(A). Choose p 2 S with respect to z according
to (i). Then, setting r1 = (p; z), we have
r1 = (p; z) = 1 = maxfr01 : (r01; r02) 2 Q(x1; x2)g;
and because z   p 2 A for all suﬃciently small  > 0, we can again choose x for
player 1 to get u1(x; x2) ! r1. In view of Example 1 and Remark 9 (the latter in
Section A.5.1) it follows that virtual continuity is satisfied.
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A.5.8 Proof of the claim in Remark 4(b)
From (iii) in the proof of Lemma 3 we see that on (A A)n(D \ (bd(A) bd(A))),
Q is the smallest closed correspondence which includes the map (u1; u2), writing D
for the diagonal in A  A. Now if x1 = x2 = z 2 bd(A) and p 2 S, consider any
z0 2 int(A). Then by (ii) in the proof of Lemma 3, (p; z0 + (1   )z) ! (p; z)
as  ! 0, and it follows that on the entire domain A  A, Q is the smallest closed
correspondence which includes the map (u1; u2).
A.5.9 Proof of Theorem 5
The proof of the equality E( ) \W = I( ) \W (points (a)-(e) below) amounts, in
essence, to a reinterpretation of the proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorems 1, 3, and 4,
with T  A in place of X; note that for the arguments in the proofs of those results
it does not matter whether or not the ’s appearing there are product measures.
(a) For each q 2 SQ and i 2 N , define value functions vqi : M ! R in the same
way as in Section 3. Then, provided that  2 W , -virtual continuity implies that
vqi() = vq0i() for any q, q
0 2 SQ and any i 2 N . This follows as in the proof of
Lemma 2, just replace Mi by Wi in the definition of the set H there. Consequently,
for any q, q0 2 SQ, if  2 W then  2 E(Gq) implies  2 E(Gq0) if and only if
qi() = q
0
i() for each i 2 N .
(b) From (a) we see that E( ) \ W = Ieﬀ( ) \ W , arguing as in the proof of
Theorem 1 (replacing virtual continuity by -virtual continuity).
(c) Next note that I( ) \ W = f 2 E( ) \W : (Di) = 0 for all i 2 Ng; see
the proof of Theorem 3.
(d) Putting (a) and (b) together we see that if  2 E( )\W and q, ~q 2 SQe , then
qi() = ~qi(). It follows from this by arguments as in (i) of the proof of Theorem 4
that if  2 E( ) \W , then (Deﬀi ) = 0 for each i 2 N .
(e) -strong indeterminacy means that if  2 W , then (Deﬀi ) = 0 implies
(Di) = 0. From (c) and (d) we therefore conclude that E( ) \W = I( ) \W .
(f) It remains to see that E( ) \W 6= ;. To this end, let q 2 SQ be such thatP
i2N qi(t; a) = maxr2Q(t;a)
P
i2N ri for each (t; a) 2 T  A. Note that since Q is uhc
with nonempty compact values, (t; a) 7! Pi2N qi(t; a) is bounded and usc. Taking
i as control measure for Wi, give each Wi the narrow topology for Young measures
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(see Appendix A.4). Then (by Theorem 9 in Appendix A.4) each Wi becomes a non-
empty compact convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space. Consider
the normal form game G = (Wi; qi)i2N , where payoﬀs are specified as above. Suppose
temporarily that G has a Nash equilibrium, say  = (1; : : : ; n). Thus, for each
i 2 N , i 2 Wi and qi()  qi(i;  i) for all i 2 Wi. Pick any i 2 N and suppose
there is a i 2 Mi with qi(i;  i) > qi(). Then, given " > 0, -virtual continuity
implies that there is a i 2 Wi such that qi(i;  i) > qi(i;  i)   ", which implies
qi(
0
i;  i) > qi() if " is small enough. But this contradicts the fact that  is a
Nash equilibrium of G and we conclude that  2 E( ) \W . Now by Reny (1999,
Theorem 3.1), G has a Nash equilibrium if G is quasi-concave, payoﬀ secure, and
 7!Pi2N qi() is usc onW . Quasi-concavity is clear. The other facts are established
in what follows.
(g) Give W =
Q
i2N Wi the product topology defined from the Wi’s. Let fW be
the set of all Young measures from T to M(A). Take  as control measure for fW
and give fW the corresponding narrow topology for Young measures. As noted above,
given  2 W , the map t 7! 1(t1)  n(tn) is a Young measure from T !M(A).
We may therefore define a map f : W ! fW by setting
f()(t) = 1(t1)     n(tn); t 2 T;  2 W:
It follows from Lemmata 12 and 13 in Appendix A.4 that f is continuous. Now let
 : T  A ! R be a bounded and usc. By Balder (1988, Theorem 2.2), the map
~ 7! R
T
R
A
(t; a) d~(t) d(t) : fW ! R is usc. Consequently, as f is continuous, the
map  7! R
T
R
A
(t; a) df()(t) d(t) : W ! R is usc. By the definition of f , it follows
that the map  7! R
TA (t; a) d(t; a) : W ! R is usc.
(h) As noted above, (t; a) 7! Pi2N qi(t; a) is bounded and usc. Consequently, in
view of (g), the map
 7!
X
i2N
qi() =
X
i2N
Z
TA
qi(t; a) d(t; a) =
Z
TA
X
i2N
qi(t; a) d(t; a)
is usc on W .
(i) Combining Lemmata 12–14 in Appendix A.4 shows that if i 2 N , i 2 Wi, and
hki is a sequence in W with k ! , then (i;k; i) ! (i; i). From this and the
argument in the proof of Lemma 9 we can see that G is payoﬀ secure.
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A.5.10 Proof of Theorem 7
Without loss of generality, consider i = 1. Fix any q 2 SQ,  2 M1  W 1, and
" > 0. Use (2) and Lemma 11 to find a h0 2 S1 such that q1(h0 ;  1)  q1().
Define h : T1 ! A1 by setting h(t1) = f1(t1; h0(t1)) for t1 2 T1. By (4)(i), h 2 S1 .
Also by (4)(i), q1(t1; t 1; h(t1); a 1)  q1(t1; t 1; h0(t1); a 1) for each t1 2 T1 and each
(t 1; a 1) 2 T 1  A 1; thus, q1(h;  1)  q1(h0 ;  1)  q1().
We claim that for each k 2 N n f0g there is a gk 2 S1 such that
(a) kh(t1)  gk(t1)k < 1=k for all t1 2 T1;
(b) (g ; 1)(D1) = 0;
(c) gk(t1) 2 1(t1; h(t1)) for 1-a.e. t1 2 T1.
To see this, let () 1 be the product measure on T 1 defined from the measures
2; : : : ; n and let 
()
 1 be the uniquely determined probability measure on T 1A 1
such that  () 1 (CB) =
R
C
2(t2) : : :n(tn)(B) d() 1 (t) for each C 2 B(T 1) and
B 2 B(A 1). We claim that the set E = fa1 2 A1 :  () 1 (T 1 1;a1) = 0g is a dense
G-set, writing 1;a1 for the section of 1 at a1. Indeed, for each i 2 Nnf1g and each
0  h  `, the set Ri;h = fr 2 R :  () 1 (f(t 1; a 1) 2 T 1  A 1 : ai;h = rg) > 0g is
countable. Observe that if a1 =2 E, then there must be an i 2 Nnf1g and 0  h; h0  `
such that  () 1 (f(t 1; a 1) 2 T 1  A 1 : ai;h = a1;h0g) > 0. We must therefore have
A1 nE =
S
h0
S
i6=1
S
h
S
r2Ri;hfa1 2 A1 : a1;h0 = rg. Because A1 is convex and has
non-empty interior, the set fa1 2 A1 : a1;h0 = rg is closed and nowhere dense in A1 for
each r 2 R, and the claim about E follows by Baire’s category theorem.
Now, for each k 2 N n f0g, define a correspondence Fk : T1nC1 ! A1 by setting
Fk(t1) =

a1 2 A1 : kh(t1)  a1k < 1=k
	 \ 1(t1; h(t1)) \ E
for each t1 2 T1nC1. Then Fk has a measurable graph. As (t1; h(t1)) 2 graph(1) and
h(t1) 2 f1(graph(1)) for each t1 2 T1nC1, it follows by (4)(iv) and the properties
of E that Fk has non-empty values. Consequently, by Castaing and Valadier (1977,
Theorem III.22, p. 74), Fk has a universally measurable selection g0k : T1nC1 ! A1.
Choosing a suitable extension to all of T1, and making modifications on a 1-negligible
set, if necessary, we obtain a gk 2 S1 such that (a) and (c) hold.
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As for (b), observe that, for each k 2 N n f0g,Z
T
gk(t1) 2(t2) : : : n(tn)(1) d(1  : : : n)(t)
=
Z
T
2(t2) : : : n(tn)(1;gk(t1)) d(1  : : : n)(t)
=
Z
T1
Z
T 1
2(t2) : : : n(tn)(1;gk(t1)) d() 1 (t 1) d1(t1)
=
Z
T1

()
 1 (T 1 1;gk(t1)) d1(t) = 0; because gk(t1) 2 E for 1-a.e. t1 2 T1:
We must therefore have gk(t1)  2(t2)  : : :  n(tn)(1) = 0 for 1  : : :  n-a.e
t 2 T , hence also for -a.e. t 2 T , because  is absolutely continuous with respect to
1  : : : n. Consequently (gk ; 1)(T 1) = 0, and thus (3) implies (b).
As the countable union of null sets is a null set, there must be a -null set H  T
such that gk(t1)2(t2) : : :n(tn)(1) = 0 for all k 2 Nnf0g and all t 2 TnH. Let
H1  T1 be the exceptional set from (c) and let H 0 = H [ (H1T 1)[ (C1T 1), so
thatH 0 is a -null set in T . Fix any t 2 TnH 0. Using Fubini’s theorem and the fact that
the countable union of null sets is a null set, we see that for 2(t2) : : : n(tn)-a.e.
a 1 2 A 1 we have gk(t1)(1;a 1) = 0 for all k 2 Nnf0g, i.e., (gk(t1); a 1) =2 1 and
thus (t1; t 1; gk(t1); a 1)) =2 D1 (as D1  1). Combining this with (c), (4)((iv)), and
the fact that (t1; t 1; h(t1); a 1) is a continuity point of q1 if (t1; t 1; h(t1); a 1) =2 D1,
we see that
lim
k!1
q1(t1; t 1; gk(t1); a 1)  q1(t1; t 1; h(t1); a 1)  "
for 2(t2) : : : n(tn)-a.e a 1 2 A 1. Hence, by Fatou’s lemma,
lim
k!1
Z
A 1
q1(t1; t 1; gk(t1); a 1) d2(t2) : : : n(tn)(a 1)

Z
A 1
q1(t1; t 1; h(t1); a 1) d2(t2) : : : n(tn)(a 1)  ";
or, in other words,
lim
k!1
Z
A
q1(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) dgk(t1) 2(t2) : : : n(tn)(a 1)

Z
A
q1(t1; t 1; a1; a 1) dh(t1) 2(t2) : : : n(tn)(a 1)  ":
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Since this is true for -a.e. 2 T , we now see, again using Fatou’s lemma, that
lim
k!1
q1(gk ;  i) = lim
k!1
Z
T
Z
A
q1(t; a) d(gk(t1) 2(t2) : : : n(tn)) d(t)

Z
T
lim
k!1
Z
A
q1(t; a) d(gk(t1) 2(t2) : : : n(tn)) d(t)

Z
T
Z
A
q1(t; a) d(h(t1) 2(t2) : : : n(tn)) d(t)  "
= q1(h;  1)  "  q1()  "; by the choice of h:
Thus, as q 2 SQ,  2M1W 1, and " > 0 are arbitrary, the requirements of -virtual
continuity are satisfied for player 1. As the consideration of player 1 does not imply
any loss of generality,   is -virtually continuous.
A.5.11 Proof of Theorem 8
For each i; j 2 N , i 6= j, and each 0  h; h0  `, let
Ki;0 = (T  A)n(graph(i) T i  A i)
and
Ki;j;h;h0 = f(t; a) 2 T  A : fi;h(ai;h) = ti;h and ai;h = aj;h0g:
Let
K =
[
i2N
Ki;0 [
[
i2N
[
j2N;j 6=i
[`
h=1
[`
h0=1
Ki;j;h;h0 :
By hypothesis, if (t; a) 2 DinK, then Q(t; a) = Qe(t; a). We therefore need to show
that (K) = 0 whenever  2 W . Thus fix any  2 W . By the definition of W ,
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(Ki;0) = 0 for each i 2 I. Consider any Ki;j;h;h0 . Then, by the fact that i 6= j,
(Ki;j;h;h0) =
Z
T
(t)
 fa 2 A : fi;h(ai;h) = ti;h; ai;h = aj;h0g d(t)

Z
T
(t)
 fa 2 A : fi;h(aj;h0) = ti;hg d(t)
=
Z
T
Z
Ai
 i(t i)
 fa i 2 A i : fi;h(aj;h0) = ti;hg di(ti)(ai) d(t)
=
Z
T
 i(t i)
 fa i 2 A i : fi;h(aj;h0) = ti;hg d(t)
=
Z
T
 i(t i)
 fa i 2 A i : fi;h(aj;h0) = ti;hg(t) d()(t)
=
Z
T i
Z
Ti
 i(t i)(fa i 2 A i : fi;h(aj;h0) = ti;hg

(t)di(ti)

d
()
 i (t i)
= 0;
because for each t i 2 T i, by Fubini’s theorem,
i   i(t i)
 f(ti; a i) 2 Ti  A i : fi;h(aj;h0) = ti;hg
=
Z
Ti
 i(t i)
 fa i 2 A i : fi;h(aj;h0) = ti;hg di(ti)
=
Z
A i
i
 fti 2 Ti : fi;h(aj;h0) = ti;hg d i(t i)(a i) = 0
by hypothesis (b), so  i(t i)(fa i 2 A i : fi;h(aj;h0) = ti;hg) = 0 for i-a.e. ti 2 Ti.
Since a finite union of null sets is a null set, it follows that (K) = 0.
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